Mrs. Chaplin wears a Crucifix visibly around her neck as a symbol of her Christian faith. It has
a deep religious significance to her and she has always worn the Cross as a nurse (some 30 years without difficulty or adverse comment) since her confirmation in 1971. 6. In June 2009, the employer requested verbally that Mrs. Chaplin remove her 'necklace'. Mrs. Chaplin declined as she regarded her Crucifix to be a personal statement of faith; she was distressed that her Crucifix was described as a 'necklace' and 'jewellery'. The primary issue appeared to be whether the Crucifix was visible or not. In November 2009, Mrs. Chaplin was re-deployed in a non nursing temporary position that ceased to exist in July 2010.
7. The hospital has a Uniform Policy (the "Policy"), of which paragraph 5. Muslims; namely that a Muslim doctor was permitted to wear a flowing Hijab with a brooch (jewellery that was purportedly banned). Employers denied this and did not call the doctor in question. The Employment Tribunal found in favour of the employer;
[19] The employer accepted that a magnetic clasp to secure the necklace around Mrs Chaplin's neck would ameliorate health and safety concerns but still accepted remote theoretical concerns of injury (by scratching) with no evidence of any previous injury, or of a risk assessment 5 ;
[23] The Employment Tribunal accepted the employer's position that all staff complied with the Policy despite the fact that evidence was given that items of jewellery were seen on staff, as the 'sightings' were not in the clinical setting and clinical duties were not being undertaken;
[27] The Employment Tribunal followed Eweida that for indirect discrimination to exist there must be more than one person affected by the policy banning Crucifixes (issue of meaning of 'Group' remains uncertain) and, further, any other person must have an identical religious view to Mrs. Chaplin and be prepared to lose employment over the wearing of a Crucifix around the neck to fulfil the definition of 'particular' disadvantage. A solitary individual does not suffice;
[29] The dissenting panel member held that there should have been a risk assessment, and greater attention should have been given to clause 5.1.11 of the Policy. However, both these issues fail to address the legal need for multiple victims, or the adverse findings of fact.
15. Article 35 of the ECHR requires that remedies available must be 'effective' ; the remedy must be available and sufficient 6 . However, Eweida has decided that there must be 'group' disadvantage; the meaning is unclear but a solitary applicant is insufficient for protection in national law. Further, the second (or 'group') person must have the same conviction as the applicant and be prepared to lose employment in identical or near identical circumstances to the complainant. In the light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Eweida, there is no prospect of success in the current case.
16. Article 35 should be applied with 'some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism' 7 ;
and the United Kingdom government will not be able to establish that a solitary believer has secured protection since the decision of the Court of Appeal in Eweida. 20. The Court must be suspicious of any 'purported' waiver of Convention Rights 9 . Further, the approach outlined above has given discretion to the employer as to which religious manifestation he may decide is suitable for endorsement and recognition. In other contexts, the opposition to fundamental rights by an employee who may have a homophobic or racist objection would not be accorded such deference.
In Barankevich v Russia
10 , the Court simply did not accept assertions on public safety and order and required substantive evidence of this factor. In Vogt v Germany 11 , Convention Rights were applicable to the employment context and a proportionality requirement had to be fulfilled. 27. Article 9 rights are very important and religious activity is generally one of self denial and service, which the State should recognize are a public virtue and not in terms of discrimination. Articles 8 and 10 ECHR deal with a specific aspect of the human existence; whilst Article 9 is comprehensive to a person's life. Religious rights are clearly primary rights; religion directs every aspect of an individual's life. It is a comprehensive code of conduct of relationship between man and God. Spiritual sanction is more severe than secular sanction relating as it does to the after-life.
28. Of course, this does not mean that anyone can do anything they want in the name of religion and Article 9; it simply means that similarly with other Convention Rights the limitation contained in Article 9(2) must be rigorously examined and strictly construed.
29. It is submitted that in both Chaplin and in Eweida Article 9 provides the necessary answer. A wide and sensible meaning needs to be given to religious manifestation within the second sentence of Article 9(1); thereafter it falls on the State to justify the restriction within Article 9(2).
30. A solitary individual can partake of the protection of Article 9, as there is no such limiting provision. The Court should not require evidence of religious practice or whether it is mandatory or whether others have the same religious conviction.
14 In both cases, it is submitted that there would be difficultly in justification, especially in the light of Article 14 where other religious practices by other religious groups are recognised. It is religious animus for an employer not to make 'reasonable accommodation ' for a religious employee; even if the employer is not motivated by hostility to religion per se, but is driven by economic concerns.
31. The Court of the United Kingdom does not, as such, adequately protect religious freedom within Article 9. When UK Courts consider religious freedom issues the focus is on discrimination law which is distinct from legislation dealing with religious freedom. First, as discussed, discrimination law applies to groups and not to individuals (or those with unusual beliefs). Secondly, if everyone is treated the same or equally badly there is, prima facie, no discrimination. This interpretation gives the discretion to the employer to promote or suppress those religions he approves or disapproves of. Religious adherents want to manifest their faith and discrimination and the discrimination/equality analysis currently being used by the Courts does not address this specific behavioural issue of religious practice. In short, religious accommodation may entail a degree of beneficial treatment by, in this case, the employer, however the Courts seem unwilling to come to this conclusion, or are prevented from so doing because of the context in which they are directed to consider the issues before them.
32. In the US Supreme Court of Thomas v Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division 15 , First Amendment protection was granted to a religious adherent, despite the fact that his religious views were distinct from the religious group/work colleague that adhered to the same religious community. Mr. Thomas was a pacifist and did not wish to build tanks but he sought unemployment benefits. Although he had acted inconsistently (previously he had been employed in military work) and fellow adherents were not pacifist, the Supreme Court held that views can be imprecisely articulated, not in conformity with the religious community, and can be solitary. 
